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WHAT CONSTITUTES A CHANGE IN BUSINESS IN THE
CONTEXT OF SECTION 382(a) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
HERBERT ODELL*
I. AN APPLICABLE SITUATION
Assume that the "Handy Glove .Corporation" was engaged in making
women's gloves. In 1948, "Handy" incurred a 250,000 dollar net operating
loss. In January of 1949, the outstanding stock of "Handy" was purchased
by the "Alright Watch Importers," a partnership engaged in importing and
selling Swiss watches. Immediately subsequent to the purchase, all of the
assets of "Handy" were sold and "Alright" transferred all of its assets to the
corporate shell, so that the corporation could now engage in the business
of importing and selling watches. Although "Handy" had been a failure
in the glove business, it was quite successful in the sale of watches. During
1949 it had earned income of 250,000 dollars. In filing its tax return for
1949, "Handy" seeks to carry over the 1948 loss so that it will have no
federal income tax liability. The Tax Court on the basis of its original
interpretation of pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939
would have permitted the carryover.1 To remedy this situation and thereby
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1959; LL.B., University of Miami, 1962; former-
ly Editor-in-Chief of the University of Miami Law Review.
1. [Allusions to § 129 refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, added by
Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 128, 58 Stat. 47 (1944). Allusions to §§ 382(a)-(c) refer
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.]
Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948) exemplifies a factual situation similar
to the one presented in the text. The Tax Court held that the loss in this situation could
be carried over. Although § 129 ("If (1) any person or persons acquire .... directly or
indirectly, control of a corporation, or (2) any corporation acquires . .. directly or indirectly,
property of another corporation . . . and the principal purpose for which such acquisition
was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income or excess profits tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would
not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit or other allowance shall not be allowed.")
was not applicable because of its effective date, the court stated that it would not be applied
in the future to similar factual situations (hereinafter referred to as an "Alprosa situation").
"That section would seem to prohibit the use of a deduction, credit, or allowance only by
the acquiring person or corporation and not their use by the corporation whose control was
acquired." Alprosa Watch Corp., supra at 245. (Emphasis added.)
The Tax Court adhered to its dicta in Alprosa in a case in which the Commissioner
sought to apply § 129 under an unusual factual pattern. The acquiring corporation sustained
heavy net operating losses. It purchased the acquired corporation and had all of the operat-
ing assets of the acquired corporation liquidated and transferred to itself. It then sought to
offset the income earned on these newly acquired assets against its net operating loss carry-
over. The Commissioner allocated the income earned on these assets to the acquired
corporation which was still in existence, although it was only a corporate shell, and
attempted to tax it on this income. One of the Commissioner's arguments in the Tax
Court was the applicability of § 129. The Tax Court held this contention invalid on the
basis of the "acquired-acquiring" distinction, in that the section was only applicable to the
acquiring corporation, which was not before the court. T.V.D. Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957).
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prevent "trafficking in loss corporations,' 2 Congress enacted section 382(a)
into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 3
II. SECTION 382(a)
For a "loss corporation"4 to fall within the confines of section 382(a)
and thus lose its net operating loss carryover there must be: (1) a change
of ownership;5 (2) by a purchase or redemption of stock;6 and (3) the
corporation must not continue to "crry on a trade or business substan-
The Tax Court's interpretation of §, 129 apparently turned on a grammatical point.
Section 129 disallows a deduction, credit, or allowance when "any person ...acquire[s]
...control of a corporation . . . [the principal purpose of the acquisition being tax avoid-
ance] by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person
• ..would not otherwise enjoy." (Emphasis added.) The dichotomy drawn by the Tax
Court seemed to turn on the reference of the word "which." That is, if it referred to
"benefit" then the Tax Court's interpretation of the section would be incorrect, but if it
referred to "deduction, credit or other allowance" then the Tax Court was right.
The Tax Court subsequently reversed itself on this interpretation of § 129 (Thom-
as E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1961)) after
being overruled several times by the courts of appeals, James Realty Co. v. United States,
280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278
F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.
1959). The Tax Court adopted the Commissioner's rationale that "so long as the
enjoyment of the benefit is in the acquiring person, it does not matter whether the actual
deduction which produces the benefit is claimed by the acquiring person or the acquired
corporation." Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., supra at 405.
2. See Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201 n.l (1960), which gives some indication as to
how "loss corporations" were advertised for sale in leading financial papers.
One writer refers to the litigation surrounding the interpretation of § 172 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (this section concerns the net operating loss-carrybacks
and carryovers) as "the War of the Loss Corporations." Butler, Purchase and Use of Loss
Corporations Under 1954 Internal Revenue Code, U. So. CAL. 1957 TAx INST. 121.
3. "This special limitation on net operating loss carryovers [§ 382] provides an
objective standard governing the availability of a major tax benefit which has been abused
through trafficking in corporations with operating loss carryovers, the tax benefits of which
are exploited by persons other than those who incurred the loss." H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
See also Browne, Traffic in Tax Loss Corporations, 2 BOSTON B.J. 27, 28 (Oct.
1958), who states in reference to § 382(a) that "this provision was inserted into the Code
to overcome the effect of the Al prosa Watch decision, which allowed a loss carryover to a
corporation which completely changed its name and its business and whose stock was
acquired by entirely different interests than those who owned it at the time the losses
were incurred." See also Comment. 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1258 (1960).
Professor Bittker indicates that § 382(a) was passed because § 129 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 269) was ineffective against trafficking in loss corporations due to the
requirement of the section that the government had to prove that tax avoidance was the
principal or primary purpose of a transaction before §- 129 became applicable. BITTKER,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.42 (student ed.1959). 4. A "loss corporation" as used throughout this paper is one that is entitled to a loss
carryover or carryback under § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
At least one article has indicated that § 382(a) might not be applicable to a merger
of a "loss corporation" into the profitable corporation that acquired it. Relying on the
wording of the section itself, the theory is espoused that the limitation of the section is only
applicable when the "loss corporation" is the one trying to offset the carryover against the
income of a newly acquired business. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1278 n.372 (1960).
Thus, when the carryover is permitted to cross corporate lines under § 381 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the limitation, on the basis of this theory, will not be applicable.
5. Section 382(a) (1) (A).
6. Section 382(a) (1) (B).
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tially the same as that conducted before any change in . . . ownership." 7
This article will be limited to what constitutes a change in business in the
context of the proposed regulations8 relating to this subject matter. How-
ever, the other two requirements of section 382(a) will be discussed briefly.
The change in ownership required in section 382(a) is a 50 percentage
"point"9 increase in total fair market value of stock 10 owned by the ten
largest stockholders at the end of the taxable year, determined by a com-
parison between what they owned at the beginning of the immediate taxable
year or the beginning of the preceding taxable year with what they own
at the end of the present taxable year. Thus, the required 50 "point"
increase may occur over a two-year period. It should be noted that in
determining the ten largest shareholders the attribution rules of section
31811 are applicable.
1 2
Secondly, there must be a "purchase" or redemption of stock which is
the basis of the change in ownership.13  Generally, for there to be a "pur-
chase" the stock must have been acquired in a sale or a taxable exchange. 14
The corporation may also redeem the stock of the shareholders, dispropor-
tionately, so that there is an increase in the percentage of stock owned by
the ten largest shareholders. If X corporation has two shareholders, A and
B, who each own 50 per cent of the outstanding stock of X, and the
corporation redeems all of A's shares, B has had a 50 percentage point
increase in the amount of shares he now owns within the terms of section
382(a).15
7. Section 382(a) (1) (C).
8. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a), 25 Fed. Reg. 13775 (1960).
9. A 50 percentage point increase is not the same as a 50% increase. If a stockholder
owns 10% of the fair market value of the stock on January 1, 1959, and 20% of the fait
market value of the stock on December 31, 1960, his percentage point increase is 10, while
he has a 100% increase. Thus, in order to meet the change in ownership requirement,
50% of the proper stock must change ownership through the ten largest stockholders within
a two year period. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(d)(1), 25 Fed. Reg. 13776
(1960).
10. " 'Stock' means all shares except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as
to dividends." Section 382(c).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 318.
12. Section 382(a) (3) provides for the application of the attribution rules of § 318
(INT. REV. CODE OF 1954), "except that section 318,(a) (2) (C) shall be applied without
regard to the 50'percent limitation contained therein."
Care should be exercised in determining whether there has been a change in owner-
ship by 10 persons. The term "10" is misleading. If the 10th person had a 2 percentage
point change in ownership and the l1th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th persons also had a 2
percentage point change in ownership, then 15 persons :would comprise the required 10
largest shareholders. The last 6 persons would be considered one for purposes of §
382(a)(1)(A). Section 382(a)(2). See the Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1(c)(1),
25 Fed. Reg. 13775 (1960).
13. Section 382(a)(1)(B).
14. " [T] he term 'purchase' means the acquisition of stock, the basis of which is deter-
mined solely by reference to its cost to the holder thereof . . . ." Section 382(a) (4). An
acquisition of stock by gift or bequest is not by "purchase." Proposed Treas. Reg. §
1.382(a)-l(e)(1), 25 Fed. Reg. 13777 (1960).
15. Section 382(a)(1)(B)ii; see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l (g)(1), 25 Fed.
Reg. 13778 (1960).
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The third requirement of section 382(a) is that there must be a
continuation of substantially the same trade or business as was conducted
prior to the change in ownership. 16  This requisite will be considered and
analyzed in detail in the following sections of this article.
For the limitation of section 382(a) to be applicable, all three of the
aforementioned requirements must have occurred. If there is this concur-
rence, the net operating loss carryover of the "loss corporation" will be
eliminated in its entirety.' 7 Apparently, Congress was not concerned with
the carryback of a loss as no provision was made for its limitation. It should
be noted that section 269,'1 which disallows the benefit of a deduction,
credit or other allowance if a person or persons19 acquire control20 of a
corporation for the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of federal
income tax, may be applicable to a situation which would normally fall
within 382(a), but which has failed to meet one of its requisites. Congress
has indicated that section 269 is not applicable when section 382 would
apply, but the fact that 382(a) does not limit the net operating loss carryover
does not affect the adhibition of section 269.21 Thus, in addition to the
requirements of section 382(a), section 269 should always be considered.
To avoid the disallowance of a net operating loss carryover in a situation
similar to the one presented in section I, there must be a business purpose
for the transaction, 22 for if the ban of section 382(a) is not applicable, the
alternative ban of section 269 might be a.2 In these transactions section 269
is ubiquitous.24
16. Section 382(a)(1)(C).
17. "If, at the end of a taxable year of a corporation ... [the three requirements are
met] the net orating loss carryovers, if any, from prior taxable years of such corporation
• ..shall not be included in the net operating loss deduction for such taxable year and
subsequent taxable years." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 382(a). See generally, 3 RIA
Fed. Tax Coord. M 7105.
18. INT. REV. COnE oF 1954. [All references to § 269 hereinafter refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.]
19. The term "person or persons" includes a corporation. Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.269-1(d), 25 Fed. Reg. 12704 (1960).
20. Control means ownership of sufficient stock to have 50% of the total voting power
or at least 50% of the total value of shares of all classes of stock. Section 269(a).
21. "If a limitation in this section [382] applies to a net operating loss carry-over,
section 269, relating to acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax, shall not also be
applied to such net operating loss carry-over. However, the fact that a limitation under this
section does not apply shall have no effect upon whether section 269 applies." S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954).
22. "In light of the current developments, it would now appear that the loss carry-
over in corporate acquisitions will be barred unless a business purpose other than tax avoid-
ance can be proven." Golding, Recent Developments in Tax Loss Corporate Acquisitions,
39 TAXEs 323 (1961). For a recent case, see Urban Redevelopment Corp., 34 T.C. 845
(1960), which dealt with the applicability of §§ 129 and 269, and the requirement of a
business purpose in the acquisition of a "loss corporation."
23. See note 1 supra in relation to the Tax Court's new interpretation of the applica-
bility of § 269 in an "Alprosa situation."
24. See note 21 supra. It should be noted that § 269, which was formerly § 129 of
the 1939 Code, was strengthened when Congress enacted subsection (c) into its provisions
in the 1954 Code. This subsection creates a presumption of a tax avoidance purpose when
the price paid upon an acquisition is substantially disproportionate to the sum of the adjusted
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DOCTRINE
Before considering the proposed regulations relating to a change in
business under section 382(a), the development of judicial and Internal
Revenue Service doctrine pertinent to these regulations will be considered.
Section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for a three
year carryback and a five year carryforward of a net operating 1OSS.25 Section
381 of the Code provides for the succession of the loss carryover2 6 to a
corporation that acquires a "loss corporation's" assets under certain tax free
reorganizations 27 and liquidations. 28 Prior to the adoption of this section in
the 1954 Code, there was no specific provision for the retention of this tax
attribute. Thus, in cases in which the corporate entity that suffered the net
operating loss changed its legal form, or the loss was being offset against a
business completely different from the one that sustained it, whose ownership
had changed, the question of whether the carryover would be allowed turned
on doctrinal rather than statutory considerations. 2 In essence, a common-law
theory developed concerning the meaning of the term "the taxpayer" as
used in the early provisions relating to net operating loss carryover. 0 For
example: section 122(b) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code 3t provided
that "if for any taxable year ...the taxpayer has a net operating loss, such
basis of the property of the corporation and the tax benefits available as a result of the
acquisition. Some writers believe that it is not really clear whether or not this presumption
has strengthened the section to any degree. See Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1237
(1960). The proposed regulations state that the presumption "is to give further weight
to the presumption of correctness already arising from the Commissioner's determination
.. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.269-5(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 12705 (1960).
25. This was formerly § 122 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, added by ch. 619,
§ 153, 56 Stat. 847 (1942).
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381(c)(1). The section also provides for the carry-
over of other tax attributes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381(c)(2)-(22). One writer
has indicated that certain tax attributes may have been omitted inadvertently from the pro-
visions of the section and most likely will be treated in a similar manner to those listed in
§ 381 (c). Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAX L. REV.
207 (1961).
27. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 381(a)(2). Section 381(b)(3) specifically denies
the right to carry back a loss by the acquiring corporation. However, losses incurred after
the acquisition may be carried back against the income of the acquiring corporation earned
prior to the transfer. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c) (1)-1(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 758
(1960).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381 (a) (1). For a general discussion of this section
see Wood, How to Transfer Net Operating Losses, Other Carryovers, to Acquiring Cor-
porations, 7 J. TAXATION 334 (1957); Germain, Carryovers in Corporate Acquisitions, 15
TAX L. REV. 35 (1959).
29. At least some writers think that the judicial doctrines developed in the past may
still be applicable in determining whether or not a loss carryover will be allowed to cross
corporate lines after an acquisition of a "loss corporation" when 381 may not be applicable.
Others feel that § 381 is exclusive. Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1201, 1267 n.300 (1960).
30. For a leading case illustrating the point, see New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435 (1934). See also Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (ist
Cir. 1956).
The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 231, provided that if "any
taxpayer has sustained a net loss [this net loss] ...shall be deducted from the net income
of the taxpayer for the succeeding taxable year." (Emphasis added.)
31. See note 25 supra. (Emphasis added.)
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net operating loss shall be a net operating loss carryover for each of the
two succeeding taxable years." In drafting the 1954 loss carryover provision,
the use of the term "the taxpayer" was carefully avoided. 32
The first theory that developed judicially as to the allowance of a
loss carryover when the corporation that sustained the loss changed its
form was the "entity" theory. In New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helveringa3
the Supreme Court disallowed a loss carryover when the assets of the "loss
corporation" were transferred to a newly organized corporation in exchange
for stock. The shareholders of the transferee corporation were substan-
tially the same as the shareholders of the transferor. The business of the
transferor was continued by the transferee. The transaction was motivated
by a business purpose and was not carried on as a tax avoidance scheme. 34
Thus, there was a continuity of ownership and business, without tax avoid-
ance motivation, but the Court refused to allow the transferee to apply
the loss against the income subsequently earned by it. There was, there-
fore, an adherence to a stringent formulary entity approach. If the corporate
entity seeking to deduct the loss carryover was not the same entity that bad
sustained it, even though there was a continuity of business and ownership,
"the taxpayer" was not the same "taxpayer" which had sustained the loss. 5
Subsequent to the decision in New Colonial, the courts of appeals
began carving exceptions into the rule. The first basic chip fell when a
carryover was permitted to cross corporate lines when there was a statutory
merger of a parent corporation with its subsidiary.36  The indentation
32. Section 172(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: "A net operating
loss for any taxable year ...shall be ...a net operating loss carryover to each of the 5
taxable years following the taxable year of such loss."
33. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
34. The transferor corporation had started off poorly and suffered losses. It decided
to reorganize and set itself up on a stronger financial foundation. The transferee corporation
made plans to obtain new financing and made agreements with prior creditors to extend-the
due date of existing debts.
35. "[T]he statutes have disclosed a general purpose to confine allowable losses to
the taxpayer sustaining them, i.e., to treat them as personal to him and not transferable to
or usable by another." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
The Court in New Colonial left the door open for an exception to this strict entity
approach when it stated that the transfer of assets from one corporation to the other "was
voluntary and contractual, not by operation of law." Id. at 441. This was seized upon by
the courts of, appeals as a rational basis for distinguishing New Colonial from cases which
allowed the carryover to cross corporate lines because there was a merger by "operation of
law" (a statutory merger). See Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st
Cir. 1956). See also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner. 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955);
Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949); Koppers Co. v.
United States, 134 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
The basic issue presented in New Colonial centered around the term "the taxpayer"
as used in the Revenue Act of 1921 (see note 30 supra). The question was whether the
transferee corporation was "the taxpayer" within the meaning of the loss carryover provision.
36. Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1949). Althouah
this involved the carryover of an excess profits credit, the result is also applicable to the
carryover of a net operating loss as the terms of the excess profits carryover provision are
couched in the language of "the taxpayer," raising the same issue as is presented under
questions involving net operating loss carryovers.
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became greater when the Ninth Circuit allowed a carryover after a statutory
merger between two independent corporations.37  Later, in Newmarket
Mfg. Co. v. United States,38 the First Circuit was faced with a statutory
merger of a parent corporation and its subsidiary. Although the court could
have permitted the carryback 39 of the loss across corporate lines on the
basis of the merger of the parent into the subsidiary by the "operation of
law" merger, it chose to go further. It reasoned that the same business
that sustained the loss had had prior profitable years and even though its
form had changed, in substance it was the same "taxpayer" which had
suffered the loss which was attempting to carry it back against profitable
years. 40  If this result could not be achieved, then the purpose of the loss
carryback and carryover provisions would be subverted. 4' This reasoning
was the foundation for the largest chip in the New Colonial approach.
In F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States42 the First Circuit allowed
the carryback of a loss across corporate lines when a subsidiary had merged
into its parent, although the merger was not a statutory one (by operation
of law). The merger was effectuated by an exchange of the assets of the
subsidiary subject to its liabilities, for stock of the subsidiary held by the
parent. The subsidiary was then dissolved by a cancellation of the stock it
received. The operations of the subsidiary subsequent to the merger produced
a loss, and the parent which survived the merger sought to carry back the loss
to the income earned prior to the merger. The subsidiary had sufficient
income during the years to which the loss was sought to be carried back
to offset this loss. The court allowed the carryback rationalizing that had
the two corporations not merged, the loss carryback would have been
. The court reasoned thatsince the merger was by statute, its effect was "by operation
of law" and therefore it was not a voluntary transfer as had occurred in New Colonial. For
a later case concerning a similar question, except that a carryback was involved and the post-
merger corporations had filed consolidated returns prior to the merger, see Koppers Co. v.
United States, 134 F. Supp. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
37. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955). This case
also concerned the carryover of an excess profits credit. However, the doctrine is also
applicable to net operating loss carryovers. See note 36 supra.
38. 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956).
39. For the purposes of this section carrybacks and carryovers will be considered synon-
ymously in the development of the theory underlying their allowance across corporate lines.
40. The taxpayer in this case presented a favorable factual situation. The transferor
corporation had incorporated in one state; subsequently it decided that it would rather be
incorporated in another state. It organized a subsidiary in the second state. The trans-
feror then merged, by statute, into the corporation newly organized in the second state.
The corporation that survived the merger was substantially equivalent to the transferor
corporation that had earned the income in prior years. The surviving corporation and the
constituent corporation had these facts in common: (1) the same par value stock; (2) the
same number of shares outstanding; (3) the shares were owned bv the same parties: (4) the
corporations had the same corporate officers; and (5) the same business was conducted by
the corporations. • Therefore, the court did not find it difficult to declare that the same
"taxpayer" was seeking to carrv back the loss which had in the past eirned the income.
41. Congress intended "in enacting the carry-back privilege, to bring stability to the
tax burden of 'a business with alternating profit and loss.' " F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United
States, 261 F.2d 470, 472 (1st Cir. 1958).
42. Supra note 41, noted in 12 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (1959).
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available to the subsidiary and there was no reason to deny it this privilege
because of the tax free reorganization.43 The most compelling reason for
allowing the tax attribute of the loss carryback to survive the merger,
however, was the continuity of business and ownership of the corporation
that had suffered the loss and that had earned the income in prior years.
44
Thus, the requirement of a statutory merger as a necessity for the effectua-
tion of a succession to a loss carryover across corporate lines apparently
is no longer imposed.
A. Libson Shops
Prior to the adjudication of the Donovan case, the Supreme Court
decided Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler.45  In this decision the Court departed
from the New Colonial entity approach, and disallowed the carryover of a
loss after a statutory merger of sixteen operating corporations into a man-
agement corporation, all seventeen corporations being owned by substan-
tially the same individuals. Three of the sixteen corporations had suffered
net operating losses prior to the merger. After the merger the surviving
management corporation sought to carry over the net operating losses
against post-merger income. However, the three businesses that had sus-
tained the pre-merger losses were still operating at a deficit. Thus, their
losses were sought to be offset against the income of the other businesses.
Although the government argued New Colonial, the Court chose to ignore
it without overruling it and disallowed the loss on another theory. The
taxpayer "is not entitled to a carry-over since the income against which the
offset is claimed was not produced by substantially the same businesses
which incurred the losses." 46  This was an adoption by the Court of the
43. "If we should hold, in the present case, that the effectuation of such a reorganiza-
tion has resulted in cutting a carry-back privilege which otherwise existed, we would be
defeating the essential purposes of the Congress in enacting the provisions for tax-free
reorganizations." F. C. Donovan, Inc. v. United States, 261 F.2d 470, 476 (lst Cir. 1958).
Thus, the court rationalized the carryover of the tax attribute on the ground that Congress
permitted tax free reorganizations as they were merely changes in form. They certainly did
not intend to deny the carryover of a valuable attribute if there was a change in form only.
However, see Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16
TAx L. REV. 207, 218 n.47 (1961), who argues that the distinction made by the court
between Donovan and New Colonial, in that Donovan was decided under Code provisions
which also contained provisions for tax free reorganizations, is tenuous. To contend that
these provisions evince an intent by Congress to allow the succession of the loss carryover
when there is merely a change in form is not a valid method of departure. The reorganiza-
tion in New Colonial was most likely tax free at the time and, therefore, distinguishing on
the ground that the Revenue Act of 1921 (see note 30 supra) under which New Colonial
was decided did not contain broad tax free reorganization provisions, seems somewhat
dubious.
44. In this case the subsidiary was wholly owned by the parent. Thus, when the
subsidiary merged with the parent, the same stockholders owned the business. The business
of the subsidiary was continued after the merger.
45. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
46. Id. at 390. It should be noted that in this case a consolidated return was not filed
prior to the merger. Thus, if there had not been a merger, there would have been no
possibility, at least at the time, of using the loss carryover.
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government's alternative argument that there must be a continuity of
business enterprise for a loss carryover to survive a statutory merger.
The constitution of "continuity of business" is not clear.47  There
appear to be three elements that comprise a continuity of business: (1)
corporate entity; (2) assets; and (3) ownership."' Libson denied the loss
carryover when the entity and assets sustaining the loss were different from
the entity and assets to which the loss was to be carried.49  In the context
of these three elements it would appear that the Court relied most heavily
on the change in assets5" and therefore by implication indicated that at
least when there is no applicable statutory provision, the most important
factor in the determination of whether the carryover will be allowed across
corporate lines is the asset requirement.5 1 The Internal Revenue Service
The Court held that although § 129 was not applicable, this did not per se give rise
to the allowance of the carryover. Thus, the Court disallowed the carryover without the
benefit of § 129 and without the use of the New Colonial approach, thereby necessitating
a new approach to the loss carryover problem.
47. Libson itself has been subject to various interpretations. See Comment, 69 YALE
L.J. 1201, 1216 (1960). In fact, it may be argued that the continuity of business require-
ment as used in Libson is no more than a modified entity approach. For example: X
corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Y corporation engaged in the business of mak-
ing shoes. X merges into Y. X keeps its separate identity although it is no longer in
existence (keeps separate books, its assets are separated, etc.). All of X's assets are then
sold, and with the funds equipment is purchased, putting it in the business of making belts.
X, prior to the merger, had suffered net operating losses and after the merger it has earned
enough income in the belt business to offset the losses. On the basis of the Libson rationale
it is arguable that there is a continuity of business because X and its profits and losses are
still identifiable although it no longer exists. This is a modified entity theory-no longer
as stringent as New Colonial, but in essence based on the corporate entity without being
concerned with the legal entity. Apparently the Internal Revenue Service has not adopted
this view. See Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 475. See also text accompanying
notes 64-65 infra.
48. Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAx L. REv.
207, 220 n.59 (1961).
49. Ibid. In Libson, ownership remained the same after the merger as it was prior to
the merger. However, since the businesses (which are an aggregate of assets) that suffered
the pre-merger losses were still sustaining Tosses subsequent to the merger, the carryover if
allowed could only have been offset against the income of the other businesses (aggregate
of assets). Thus, the taxpayer sought to offset losses from one aggregate of assets against
income from an entirely different aggregate of assets. This coupled with the fact that the
pre-merger legal entity that suffered the loss was different from the post-merger legal entitv
that sought to use it, was a sufficient change of continuity of business for the disallowance
of the loss carryover. The Court, however, said that it was reserving the question as to
whether a change in assets and ownership, an "Alprosa situation," (see note 1 supra)
would be a sufficient basis to disallow the carryover. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353
U.S. 382, 390 n.9 (1957).
Under § 382(a), the loss is disallowed when there is a change in ownership and .
change in business (see part II of text) and it is submitted that according to the proposed
regulations under 4 382(a), a change in assets constitutes a change in business (see part
IV(B) of the text). Thus, it would appear that if Libson is applicable to cases srisinq
under the 1954 Code, a loss carryover will be disallowed when there is either: (1) a change
in assets and entity (Libson); or (2) a change in assets and ownership (§ 382(a)).
50. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler. 353 U.S. 382, 388 (1957).
51. See note 49 supra. Apparently the Court was of the opinion that the point it
was raising in the Libson case as to the requirement of a continuity of business was similar
to the requirement of § 382(a) as to the necessity of a continuation of substantially 4he
same trade or business. Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 388 n.7 (1957). The
Internal Revenue Service felt that the requirement of Libson as to a continuity of bisiness
(in relation to its interpretation of this requirement) was similar to the requirement of a
continuation of substantially the same trade or business found in § 382(a). The Service
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has interpreted Libson in this manner.52
The Service has ruled5 3 that it will not apply Libson to transactions
coming within section 381(a).5 4  However, section 382(b)55 may elim-
inate the carryover on a pro rata basis or in its entirety,5 and section 269
is always available when there is a corporate acquisition for tax avoidance
purposes.
B. Revenue Ruling 59-39557
The Internal Revenue Service promulgated its interpretation of Libson
in a 1959 ruling.58  Although the ruling specifically stated that it was only
applicable to the treatment of tax attributes under the 1939 Code after
a statutory merger or consolidation, it will be considered in this article
for the theory that it established, in its limited context, as to when a loss
carryover will be permitted to cross corporate lines.
Basically the ruling provides that:
[I]n the absence of any evasion or avoidance of tax, premerger
or preconsolidation net operating losses and unused excess profits
credits of an absorbed constituent may be carried over to the
resultant corporation to the extent that such losses and unused excess
profits credits offset income of the resultant corporation attributable
to assets acquired by it from the absorbed constituent . . .6
Thus, the Service interprets Libson as holding the asset requirement of
continuity of business to be the most compelling reason for allowing the
carryover of a tax attribute across corporate lines.6
apparently adopted its interpretation of Libson as promulgated in Rev. Rul. 59-395, in
designing the regulations relating to what constitutes a change in business under § 382(a)
(see part IV(B) in the text infra).
52. See note 51 supra.
53. Rev. Rul. 58-603, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 147.
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954: "In the case of the acquisition of assets of a corpora-
tion by another corporation .. . in a distribution to such other corporation to which section
332 .. .applies . . . or .. .in a transfer to which section 361 .. .applies, but only if the
transfer is in connection with a reorganization described in subparagraph (A), (C), (D) ...
or (F) of section 368(a) (1), the acquiring corporation shall succeed to and take into
account .. .[certain tax attributes itemized in subparagraph (c)].
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
56. The subsection (§ 382(b)) provides for a pro rata elimination of the loss, the
proration being dependent upon the continuity of ownership between the "loss corporation"
and the corporation which has swallowed it.
57. 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 475.
58. Ibid.
59. Thus, the Service left itself open to argue New Colonial in a case in which there
was a change in entity, but no change in assets or ownership and the fusion of the two
corporations involved was not by statute. This argument failed in the Donovan case,
however, which was decided after Libson. Thus, at least one circuit (the First) has indi-
cated that Libson did away with the entity approach.
60. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 475, 476. (Emphasis added.)
61. See Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAx L.
REV. 207, 220 (1961), who indicates that the vagueness of the Supreme Court's decision
in the Libson case leaves this interpretation subject to litigation. See note 47 supra.
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For there to be continuity of business according to Rev. Rul. 59-395,
the aggregate of assets that make up a business prior to a fusion and that
have sustained prefusion losses must remain intact postfusion, and earn
income so that the losses can be carried over against this income. Thus,
the ruling allows losses of an aggregate of assets to be offset against income
of the same aggregate of assets notwithstanding a change in the legal
identity of the business association to which the assets belong. 62 This
theory is based upon the congressional intent that predicated the enactment
of the loss carryover and carryback provision into the Code. "Congress
primarily was concerned with the fluctuating income of a single business."63
However, it should be noted in connection with the Libson decision
that the Court stated as one of the reasons for the disallowance of the
carryover that, "had there been no merger, these businesses would have had
no opportunity to carry over their losses."'64  If this reasoning is held to
permeate the Libson decision, then it changes the use of the asset test
or at least extends it further than was probably anticipated.
Thus, in determining whether a loss carryover would be allowed to
cross corporate lines, the above stated reasoning of the Libson Court might
be considered the test per se. (This will be referred to as the "but for"
test.) For example: X corporation has a wholly owned subsidiary, Y cor-
poration. Y has sustained net operating losses and is entitled to a carryover.
Y merges into X by means of a statutory merger. Assume that X keeps Y's
identity separate (separate books, etc.). X takes Y's assets and pur-
chases new assets with them, putting Y in a completely different
business. The new business earns income and X seeks to carry over the
losses against this income. If the asset test is adhered to there would be a
question of tracing. Does the asset test as promulgated in Rev. Rul. 59-395
allow or permit tracing? If it does not, there would be no continuity of
business and thus the carryover would not be allowed. However, if the
"but for" test of Libson is adopted - Would the tax attribute have been
available for use had there been no merger? - then the carryover would
-have been allowed. If tracing is permitted in determining whether the
postfusion assets earning the income are the same as the prefusion assets
that sustained the loss, then the two tests (the asset and "but for" tests)
would be substantially the same. The nomenclature would make little
difference. It should also be noted that the "but for" test may be argued
by the taxpayer to force the allowance of tracing under the asset test.65
62. The ruling placed the burden on the taxpayer to show how much of the carryover
should be allowed by showing which prefusion assets produced the loss and how much
postfusion income they produced to be offset against the loss. It would thus appear that
the taxpayer has to maintain the separate identities of the businesses in order to sustain his
burden, even though he is operating them as one.
63. Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 GuM. BULL. 475, 477.
64. Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 388 (1957).
65. It may be contended that if there had been no merger the loss carryover would
1962]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES A CHANGE OF BUSINESS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
The structure of this article is to provide a background in which the
proposed regulations"6 relating to a change in business under section 382(a)
may be discussed. It is hoped* that some rationale will be provided for the
various specifications in these proposed regulations as to what does or
does not constitute a change in business. It should be noted at the outset,
as a caveat to the reader, that the Internal Revenue Service might not
have been prompted by a demand for logical analysis in promulgating these
proposed regulations.
However, it appears that the Internal Revenue Service has adopted its
interpretation of the continuity of business requirement 7 enunciated by
Libson as the basis for the determination of a change in business under
section 382(a).111 Throughout the proposed regulations, the concept of the
asset test as defined in Rev. Rul. 59-395 permeates the provisions.61 Thus,
the proposed regulations are a further definitive of the Service's interpretation
of Libson.
A. The Time Aspect
The first question to be considered is: At what times does a change
in business have to occur for it to fall within section 382(a)? The requisite
in the Code, according to its terms, is met if the "loss corporation" does
not continue to carry on a business substantially the same as that conducted
have been available. If the original subsidiary had changed its business by using its assets
to purchase new assets and thus had gone into a new business, an attempt to carry its losses
over to income of subsequent years would have been permitted. Why should it be prevented
from doing so merely because it merged with ,its parent? However, the counter argument
to this is that the Court in Libson specifically stated that it was not ruling on a question
where assets and ownership changed (an "Alprosa situation"). Thus, a fortiori, it was not
ruling when assets alone changed. That is, that the loss could be carried over when the
same corporate entity with the same corporate ownership changed its business by purchasing
new assets. It would seem that if Libson was extended to cover this type of situation,
tracing would not be allowed and the "but for" argument would fail. The rationale would*
be that even if there had been no merger, the loss carryover would be disallowed. However,
see Reese, Reorganization Transfers and Survival of_ Tax Attributes, 16 TAX L. REV. 207,
220 n.59 (1961): "Presumably neither a change in assets nor ownership alone would affect
a loss carryover."
66. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.382(a)-l(h), 25 Fed. Reg. 13775, 13778 (1960).
[All citations to these regulations hereinafter will be referred to only by the designation:
Proposed Treas. Reg. §, (h) (1) or § (h) (2) etc.]
67. See part Ill(B) of the text supra.
68. Since the meaning of Libson is still vague, some writers think this adoption of it
in the proposed regulations will lead to litigation. See Teschner, Proposed 382 Regulations
Take Some Doubtful Positions on Loss Carryovers, 14 J. TAXATION 130, 133 (1961): Reese,
Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes, 16 TAx L. REV. 207, 220 (1961).
Both of these writers have implied that Libson has been adopted in the promulgation of
the proposed regulations. "The phrase 'substantially the same business' [used in the Libson
decision] has been construed to mean the physical assets, similarly as the sense in which the
phrase 'a trade or business' is used in section 382(a)." Reese, supra.
69. See part Ill(B) of the text supra.
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"before any change in the percentage ownership." The proposed regulations
go on to delimit this further by providing that section 382(a) is applicable
if the "loss corporation" has not continued to carry on a trade or business
substantially the same as that carried on prior to the earliest increase in
stock ownership taken into account in determining a change in owner-
ship.70 The regulations adopt a first-in, first-out theory when there has
been more than a 50 "point" 7' increase during a two year period. Thus,
if A, B, C, and D all purchase stock of the X "loss corporation," A making
his purchase on June 30, 1957 and B, C, and D making their purchases at
different times subsequent to A's purchase, but during the same year, the X
corporation must continue to carry on substantially the same business as
was conducted immediately prior to June 30, 1957, for it to avoid the
limitation of section 382(a). This is true even though A had purchased
10 per cent of the stock; B had purchased 10 per cent; and C and D had
each purchased 20 per cent. The earliest 50 "point" change during the
two year period is the one taken into account.
The proposed regulations fail to determine what business before the
change in ownership must be used as the basis for comparison with the
post-change-in-ownership business, i.e., how immediate to the change in
ownership must the business be that must be substantially continued after
the change?
72
They do provide, however, that "a change in trade or business of a
corporation made in contemplation of a change in stock ownership will be
70. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (1). This creates some ambiguity. For example
assume the following:





It would seem that in this instance the government has the option of determining
which changes in ownership are to be taken into account, i.e., A, B, C, or B, C, D. If the
change in business occurs between 6/57 and 6/58, the most advantageous changes to take
into account would be A, B, C. This would meet the requisite of § 382(a) (1) (C), as the
change in business would have occurred after the earliest change in ownership taken into
account. Suppose, however, that B, C, D had planned to purchase the corporation to
benefit from the loss carryover, but that A was an innocent purchaser who happened to
buy the stock on the open market without even considering the loss carryover. Will this
affect the determination as to which changes will be taken into account? If § 382(a) is to
be mechanical in its application, should this subjective element be considered? One might
argue a first-in, first-out theory on the basis of the regulation that has adopted this
approach. See text at note 71 infra. Of course, if a tax avoidance motive can be shown as
the basis of the acquisition, § 269 may be applicable.
71. See note 9 supra.
72. Professor Bittker believes that § 382(a) (1) (C) is only applicable to a business
carried on immediately prior to the change in ownership. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAxA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.42, at 62 n.47 (student ed. 1959). The
proposed regulations by implication give impetus to this conclusion. Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ (h) (1) states: "Section 382(a) is applicable if the corporation has not continued to carry
on a trade or business substantially the same as that conducted immediately before [the
date of the earliest purchase taken into account] .... ." (Emphasis added.)
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treated as if such change in trade or business had occurred after such change
in stock ownership. ' 73 This is when the pre-change-in-ownership change in
business is made pursuant to a plan. This is an adoption of the rationale
of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.4
The proposed regulations also fail to answer the question as to how
soon after the change in ownership, the change in business must occur. It
would appear by relating all the provisions of section 382(a) that the
change may occur at any time within the two year period in which the
change in ownership occurs."5 If the change in business is after the
two-year period, then the limitation of the section will probably not be
applicable.76
B. The Measure of a Change in Business
The holding of stock, securities or similar property and their sale or
purchase does not constitute a trade or business unless the activities histori-
cally have constituted the primary" activities of the firm.78 Thus, the
proposed regulations have taken investments out of the trade or business
classification of section 382(a) unless the firm was engaged in the
investment business.
The general factors to consider in determining whether the corporation
has continued substantially the same trade or business are: (1) changes
in corporate employees, plant, equipment, product, location and customers;
and (2) other items significant in determining whether there is a conti-
73. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h)(3).
74. 324 U.S. 331 (1944). This is actually an application of the Court Holding Co.
doctrine anologically. In this case the Supreme Court attributed the sale of an asset to a
corporation even though the sale had been completed after the shareholders had received
the asset as a liquidating dividend. The Court related the time of the sale back, whereas
the regulations relate the time of the change in business forward.
75. Section 382(a)(1)(C) "does not contain a time limit. In conjunction with
§ 382(a) (1) (A) and (B), however, it seems to mean that if all the stock of a calendar
year corporation changes hands on Jan. 1, 1958, the carryover will be entirely lost if the old
business is abandoned during 1958, that it will be lost for 1959 and later years if the busi-
ness is abandoned during 1959, and that it will not be affected (at least not by §
381 (a) [sic]) if the business is continued until 1960." BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 72.
It may be contended that if there is a "loss corporation" with a loss in 1956, on
January 1, 1957 there is a total change in ownership, and there is no change in business
thereafter until after January 2, 1959, there is a loss of the remaining years of the 1956 loss
carryover because no time limitation was set on when the business had to change. One
was specifically set relating to the length of the period in which the ownership had to change.
Thus, Congress has evidenced an intent not to limit the time in which the change of
business must occur.
76. Ibid.
77. The determination of what constitutes "primary" business apparently creates a
litigous area. The use of the term "primary" also arises under § 1221(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, in relation to whether an asset is a capital asset or inventory.
Property is inventory if it is held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business." As to the difficulty of determining whether property meets this
definition, see Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
78. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (b)(4). See in this connection Treas. Reg. §§
1.355.1(c) (I)-I(d) (1955), relating to what constitutes an active trade or business for
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nuity of the same business enterprise.79 These factors are to be evaluated
in the general light of the purpose of section 382(a) which is to "disallow
net operating loss carryovers where there is a purchase of the stock of a
corporation with losses for the purpose of using its loss carryovers to
offset gains of a business unrelated to that which produced the losses."80
In considering these elements in relation to the purpose, however, the
subjective intent and motive to purchase for the purpose of obtaining tax
benefits does not have to be shown. 81 It is only necessary to prove the
objective requirements of a change in business and ownership.
2
If a corporation reactivates a business that was dormant prior to a
change in ownership,8 3 the corporation has not continued to carry on
substantially the same trade or business as was carried on prior to the
change in ownership. This is so even though the corporation reactivates
the same business previously carried on by the corporation prior to its
inactivity. 4  The examples in the proposed regulations indicate that a
corporation that becomes inactive because of adverse business conditions,
then begins to sell its assets and remains inactive for a period of time (in
this case nine months), cannot be purchased and reactivated without being
considered as having changed its business. However, if the corporation
becomes inactive because of a fire, but during the period of inactivity
efforts are made to reactivate it, after a change in ownership and a subse-
quent reactivation of the same business the corporation will not lose its
loss carryover. Apparently, the most important difference between the two
situations is the effort to reactivate during the discontinuance caused by
the fire, and the attempt to liquidate the business that was dormant due
the purpose of § 355 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. A trade or business does not
include. "the holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land or other property,
including casual sales thereof (whether or not the proceeds of such sales are reinvested),
... the ownership and operation of land or buildings all or substantially all of which are
used .and occupied by the owner in the operation of a trade or business, or . . . a group
of activities which, while a part of a business operated for profit, are not themselves inde-
pendently producing income even though such activities would produce income with the
addition of other activities or with large increases in activities previously incidental or
insubstantial."
79. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (5).
80. Ibid. Notice the similarity of thought between this and the Internal Revenue
Service's interpretation of Libson as promulgated in Rev. Rul. 59-395, 1959-2 CuM. BULL.
475, 478. "Since, therefore, in the Libson Shops case, the income of the resultant corpora-
tion against which the premerger losses were sought to be offset was not produced by sub-
stantially the same businesses which produced the losses, the Court . . . [held that thel
corporation was not entitled to a carry-over of such losses across the line of the merger."
(Emphasis added.)
81. Thus, if motive can be shown, the government can then try to bring the transac.
tion within the provisions of § 269, if it will not fall within § 382(a).
82. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h)(5).
83. It will be assumed that the change in ownership meets the requisites of § 382(a).
84. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (6). This is an adoption of a prior ruling by the
Service as to what constitutes carryingon substantially the same trade or business. See Rev.
Rul. 58-9, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 190. This involved a corporation in the insurance business
that became dormant for a year because of adverse business conditions. It was purchased
by an individual in the insurance business who reactivated it again in the same business.
1962]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to adverse business conditions.8 5 If the proposed regulations assume that
a major portion of the producing assets were sold during the period of
inactivity, the loss incurred by the pre-change-in-ownership assets could not
be offset against the income of these same assets after the change in own-
ership. Thus, according to the asset test of Rev. Rul. 59-395, the loss carry-
over would not be permitted and this could be the basis for the distinction
between the allowance under one set of circumstances and the disallowance
under the other
Although the above parallelism between the proposed regulation and
the continuity of business test of Libson as interpreted by the Internal
Revenue Service is somewhat dubious, because it is predicated on an
assumption, the remaining regulations delineating a change in business
more clearly exposit the Libson doctrine.8
A corporation has not continued to carry on substantially the same
trade or business if it discontinues more than a minor portion of its business
subsequent to the change in ownership.8 7 The use of the term "minor"
is somewhat misleading as its determination turns on the continuity of
business requirement of Libson as defined by Rev. Rul. 59-395.88 Thus,
a substantial portion of the business may be discontinued and yet it may
not constitute a "minor" portion within the terms of the proposed regulation.
The test for ascertainment of a "minor" portion of the business is:
"whether the discontinuance of the activities has the effect of utilizing loss
carryovers to offset gains of a business unrelated to that which produced
the losses." 89  Thus, X corporation operates three businesses: A making
up 50 per cent of the business, B making up 30 per cent of the business,
and C making up 20 per cent of the business. Business C has sustained
85. Teschner has expressed a belief that the distinction made between the fire loss
and the inactivity due to adverse business conditions is tenuous. Teschner, Proposed 382
Regulations Take Some Doubtful Positions on Loss Carryovers, 14 J. TxXATION 130 (1961).
However, it was his opinion that the distinction was based on the cause of the inactivity
rather than on whether the corporation sought to continue its activity. Seemingly, if a
business went inactive because of adverse business conditions, but during the period of
inactivity an attempt was made to reactivate the corporation and there was no selling of
assets, a reactivation after a change in ownership would not constitute a change in business.
86. It would seem to be an elastic logic that could fit the above mentioned examples
into the context of the asset test of Rev. Rul. 59-395, unless the proposed regulation
assumes that a maior portion of the producing assets were sold during the period of inac-
tivity. If this, is a proper assumption, then the loss incurred by the pre-change-in-ownership
assets could not be offset against the income of these same assets subsequent to the change
in ownership, and therefore, the carryover would not be permitted. If this is what was
meant by Proposed Reg. § (h) (6), then its theory would fit the Internal Revenue Service's
interpretation of Libson's continuity of business requirement. However, if this is what was
meant it was not very clearly indicated. See Bookwalter v. Hutchens Metal Prods. Inc., 281
F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1960) in which the Libson rationale was applied to disallow a loss
carryover involving a merger with an inactive corporation.
87. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h)(7).
88. See part III(B) of the text supra.
89. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (7). See the regulations relating to consolidated
returns for a similar approach to loss carryovers. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-31 (b)(3) (1955).
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net operating losses. If business C is discontinued after a change in
ownership, the X corporation has lost its net operating loss carryover because
it has not continued to carry on substantially the same trade or business.
0
However, if business A sustained the net operating losses, discontinuance
of business C after a change in ownership will not constitute a change in
business. It should be noted that the proposed regulation in the example
states: "the capital released by the discontinuance of business C is used
to revitalize business A . . "91 This apparently is an outright adoption
of Libson in that it requires the assets that sustained the losses prior to
the change in ownership to be the same assets earning the income against
which the loss is to be offset.9 2  Although this rationale is sound in the
sense that it is an application of a theory espoused by the Supreme Court,
the government may have difficulty in convincing the courts that Congress
intended the outright adoption of a Libson theory in its enactment of sub-
section C of section 382 (a) (1) 1
3
If the "loss corporation" continues to carry on the same trade or
business activities undiminished after a change in ownership, the addition
of a new trade or business does not constitute a failure to carry on substan-
tially the same trade or business. 94  At this point, the proposed regulations
become "sticky" in holding that there is no change in business even though
the addition of the new business makes it possible to carry over the loss.
That is, had it not been for the income of the new business, there would
be nothing against which the loss carryover could be applied. This appar-
ently is a departure from the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of
Libson. The pre-change-in-ownership assets that suffered the loss are
not the post-change-in-ownership assets earning the income against
which the loss may be applied. It would seem that the government was
compelled to adopt this provision both by the words of the section itself -
if the loss "corporation has not continued to carry on a trade or business"
90. It should be noted that the example in the proposed regulations presumes the
separate businesses maintain their identity so that the business earning the income and the
one sustaining the loss can be recognized. Rev. Rul. 59-395 requires the taxpyaer to keep
sufficient records so that he can prove the prefusion assets that suffered the loss are the
same postfusion assets that ' earned the income against which the loss is to be offset. This
requisite would therefore be applicable under § 382(a). The taxpayer should keep suffi-
cient records so that he can prove which aggregate of assets he has discontinued using. See
note 62 supra.
91. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h)(7).
92. "This regulation [Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (7)] attempts to establish as part
of the law of carryovers the as yet only partly evolved Libson Shops doctrine-that carr,-
overs can be applied only against the income of the same economic entity which produced
the loss. This is the business enterprise theory of carryovers; the economic entity is deter-
mined without regard to stock ownership or continuance of the corporate entity. This
Libson Shops seed, planted in the proposed Regulations, will, and rightly so, produce a crop
of litigation." Teschner, Proposed 382 Regulations Take Some Doubtful Positions on Loss
Carryovers, 14 J. TAXATION 130, 133 (1961).
93. Ibid. See also Reese. Reorganization Transfers and Survival of Tax Attributes,
16 TAX L. REV. 207, 220 (1961).
94. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (8).
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- and by an interpretation of an expression of congressional intent which
stated that "if the corporation continued to carry on substantially the same
trade or business, the limitation [of section 382(a)] would not be applicable
even though the corporation also added a new trade or business."95  The
unfortunate aspect is that this creates a conflict, at least in theory, among
the proposed regulations themselves, and therefore creates somc doubt
as to whether they will all be upheld, or, if not all, which ones. The regula-
tions do express the caveat that the unwary should beware of section 269,
as it might be applicable in a situation of this nature. Thus, it appears
that the Service was backed into a corner and had to take cognizance of
"the handwriting on the wall" in its approach to this situation. This does
create a cloud on the outright adoption of Libson in other areas of the
proposed regulations.9 6
If there is a change of location of a major portion of a corporation's
business and the business is substantially altered, this will constitute a
change in business within the purview of section 382(a).9 7 The examples
relative to this principle indicate that a change in location accompanied by
a change in the major assets of the business would be a discontinuance of
substantially the same trade or business. Thus, when a manufacturing firm
moves to another state, and is required, because of the move, to dispose
of its plant and a majority of its equipment, and has to hire new employees
as well, it has changed its business. This is true even though it continues
to sell the same product to the same customers. Likewise, if a corpora-
tion in the retail liquor business moves to another town in the same state,
requiring it to obtain a new liquor license and new customers, it has changed
its business even though it transfers most of its inventory and half of its
ten employees. In both of these cases, the major assets of the firm were
changed in the process of relocation. Thus, if there is a substantial change
in the major assets of the "loss corporation," there is not the continuity of
business required by Rev. Rul. 59-395.18
Conversely, if the major assets of the firm are kept intact, even though
there is a change in location, the business will not be considered as having
changed substantially. Thus, if a department store relocates from the
center of a city to the suburbs and continues to sell the same product to
95. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
96. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
97. Proposed Treas. Reg. §- (h)(9).
98. It should be noted in this respect that if this is a proper interpretation of the
proposed regulations and the differentiating factor is held to be the loss of the major assets
of the firm, the examples, by implication, deny the right to trace the pre-change-in-owner-
ship assets to post-change-in-ownership assets if these assets are used to purchase new assets
after the change in 'ownership. The examples do not take cognizance of the possibility of
using the proceeds from the sale of the pre-change-in-ownership assets to buy the post-
change-in-ownership assets. Thus, the "but for" test seems to be excluded by the regula-
tions. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
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the same customers through the same employees even though it had to
dispose of its building and equipment, it has continued substantially the
same business.
The most important thread running through the example is the type
of asset retained. An asset, apparently, is a major one if it is basic
to the type of business involved, e.g., plant and equipment in the case of
a manufacturing firm, a liquor franchise and good-will (with customers)
in the case of a retail liquor dealer, and inventory and good-will (with
customers) in the case of a department store.
Similarly, there is a change in the trade or business "if the corporation
is primarily engaged in the rendition of services by a particular individual
or individuals and, after the increase in ownership, the corporation is
primarily engaged in the rendition of services by different individuals."99
The individuals are the most important and basic assets of the firm and if
they change, the trade or business has not been substantially continued.
Thus, if a corporation is in the real estate business, most of the busi-
ness being done by broker A and there is a change in ownership with broker
B taking over A's position, there has been a change in business.
However, if a corporation is operating a beauty salon with ten operators
whose skill is responsible for attracting customers, and A, the supervisor
who is also the beauty expert, is replaced by B after a change in ownership,
there is no change in business within the terms of section 382 (a).
Thus, it would appear that in determining whether the trade or business
has been substantially continued, the essential factor is the type of asset
retained. If a substantial portion of the major assets of the pre-change-in-
ownership business which sustained the loss are retained after the change
in ownership, there is no change in business. This rationale threading
through the regulations is an adoption of and in accord with the interpre-
tation of Libson in Rev. Rul. 59-395.100
CONCLUSION
The proposed regulations apply the change of business concept in two
distinct situations. One involves a factual pattern in which a corporation
99. Proposed Treas. Reg. § (h) (10).
100. Although the proposed regulations do not state that the pre-change-in-ownership
assets that incurred the loss must be retained and earn the income after the change in owner-
ship against which the loss is to be offset, this is implied throughout their provisions. When
a corporation is engaged in only one business, if the assets of the business do not earn
income, there will be no reason to carry over the loss after a change in ownership as there
will be no income against which to apply the loss. However, if the corporation is engaged
in several businesses, then the business earning the loss must be continued and earn income
against which the loss may be offset. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
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is engaged in several businesses, while the other involves a situation in
which a corporation is engaged in only one type of business. In the former
the test of Libson. as interpreted by Rev. Rul. 59-395 is applied when there
is a discontinuance of one of the businesses to ascertain whether this consti-
tutes the substantial change in business contemplated by section 382(a);
and in the latter the test is applied to determine whether an alteration in
the only business in which the corporation is involved will constitute the
requisite change.
